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Have geopolitics influenced decisions on 
American health foreign assistance efforts during 
the Obama presidency?
Background This study sought to characterize the possible relation-
ship between US geopolitical priorities and annual decisions on health 
foreign assistance among recipient nations between 2009 and 2016.
Methods Data on total planned United States (US) foreign aid and health 
aid were collected for the 194 member nations of the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) from publicly available databases. Trends in per-cap-
ita spending were examined between 2009 and 2016 across the six re-
gions of the WHO (Africa, Americas, Eastern Mediterranean, Europe, 
Southeast Asia, and the Western Pacific). Data on US national security 
threats were obtained from the Council on Foreign Relations’ annual 
Preventive Priorities Survey. Multivariable regression models were fitted 
specifying planned health aid as the dependent variable and threat level 
of a recipient aid nation as the primary independent variable.
Results Across the aggregate 80 planned recipient countries of US 
health aid over the duration of the study period, cumulative planned 
per-capita spending was stable (US$ 0.65 in both 2009 and 2016). The 
number of annual planned recipients of this aid declined from 74 in 
2009 to 56 in 2016 (24.3% decline), with planned allocations decreas-
ing in the Americas, Eastern Mediterranean, and Europe; correspond-
ing increases were observed in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Western 
Pacific. Regression analyses demonstrated a dose-response, whereby 
higher levels of threat were associated with larger declines in planned 
spending (critical threat nations: b = -3.81; 95% confidence interval 
(CI) -5.84 to -1.78, P ≤ 0.001) and one-year lagged (critical threat na-
tions: b = -3.91; 95% CI, -5.94 to -1.88, P ≤ 0.001) analyses.
Conclusions Higher threat levels are associated with less health aid. 
This is a novel finding, as prior studies have demonstrated a strong as-
sociation between national security considerations and decisions on 
development aid.
Electronic supplementary material: 
The online version of this article contains supplementary material.
journal of
health
global
The United States (US) is the largest contributor in absolute dollars to offi-
cial development assistance annually, across both health and non-health 
focus areas [1]. The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
has been one of the most successful aspects of America’s development aid 
portfolio over the last fifteen years, even in spite of debate on its eligibility 
criteria and possible negative consequences on recipient nation’s health sys-
tems [2]. With greater than US$ 65 billion spent since 2003, the program 
has achieved considerable success, significantly reducing AIDS-associated 
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mortality, morbidity, and mother-to-child transmission of the disease [3,4]. From a global security stand-
point, PEPFAR recipient countries have often benefited from improved governance, accountability, and 
political stability [2]. Though documentation of direct causality remains elusive, there is growing evidence 
of a correlation between robust health spending and improved political systems; [5] further, these find-
ings suggest that healthier societies are more likely to be safer and better functioning [6,7].
In the search for a financially sustainable and politically palatable policy approach to some of the world’s 
ongoing crises, strategic health diplomacy (SHD) may contribute a solution [2]. If PEPFAR, which receives 
strong bipartisan support in the American Congress, is correlated with safer and more governable societ-
ies in sub-Saharan Africa, SHD proponents (senators from both major parties, including Sen. Hatch and 
former Sens. Daschle and Frist) argue that US federal health aid spending could also be utilized in areas 
of critical geopolitical importance; for the purposes of this paper, geopolitics is defined as the study and/
or management of those state-based threats relating to US national security interests.
As aid budgets are imminently forecast to become leaner [8], and given the growing desire of multilater-
al donors to see broad, inter-sectoral dividends from health aid [9], expanding the scope of such assis-
tance to include more emphasis on considerations of national security may help to enhance political sup-
port and help secure future commitments to global health.
Previously, flows of official development aid (ODA) from all countries comprising the Development As-
sistance Committee (DAC) have been shown to be strongly associated with geopolitical considerations 
(the DAC consists of 30 member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment that contribute the largest amounts of ODA (in absolute terms) annually).[10] In other words, na-
tions of strategic interest (either because of economic or security concerns) are given priority in aid deci-
sions relative to nations simply in need of assistance. In the case of the United States, existing data from 
the early-2000s show a majority of its ODA is directed to more corrupt nations (as measured by the In-
ternational Country Risk Guide), whereas the nations of Scandinavia prioritize the strength of civil and 
governing institutions when selecting potential aid-recipients [11–15].
Associations between the magnitude of planned health aid and geopolitical considerations have not been 
characterized. Given the exponential growth in global health funding since the early 2000s, this study seeks 
to help clarify any possible relationship. The primary objective of the following analysis is to examine the 
relationship between a country’s geopolitical relevance to American national security interests and the mag-
nitude of its annual anticipated US health aid package. We examine trends in planned health aid spending 
over the full duration of President Barack Obama’s presidency (Fiscal Years 2009-2016) to help determine 
whether geopolitical interests are associated with the disbursement of health aid. Planned federal health 
aid was examined because we believe it better reflects the prevailing political will and strategic thinking 
within the administration in a given year with respect to a specific country. Based on a review of recent 
Obama Administration policies regarding development aid for health [16], we hypothesized that there has 
been a weak link between national security considerations and decisions on health aid over the past 8 years.
METHODS
Data collection
We reviewed data from ten US independent agencies and federal executive departments that comprise 
America’s federally-allocated foreign aid portfolio (non-federal contributions from non-governmental or-
ganizations based in the United States were not included). Data were publicly available in online data-
bases (http://beta.foreignassistance.gov). The agencies and departments reviewed were: Department of 
State (DOS), Agency for International Development (AID), Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), 
Peace Corps (PC), Inter-American Foundation (IAF), African Development Foundation (ADF), Depart-
ment of the Treasury (DOT), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), and Department of Agriculture (DOA). Full data reporting for planned foreign aid during the en-
tire study period (2009-2016) were available from the following agencies: AID, ADF, IAF, and DOT. Both 
PC and MCC have one year of missing data (2009 for PC, 2016 for MCC); the remaining agencies either 
reported partial data for all years (DOS) or had years of missing data with only partial reporting otherwise 
(HHS, DOA, DOD).
Between Feb 1, 2016 and April 1, 2016, data on planned spending were extracted for fiscal years 2009 
through 2016. Data reporting prior to 2009 was irregular, and some gaps remained post-2009 among the 
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ten agencies included in the study. Data on total planned US foreign aid and total planned US health aid 
were collected for the 194 member nations of the World Health Organization (WHO) from foreignassis-
tance.gov. In total, 80 nations were identified for planned health aid at some point during the Obama ad-
ministration. Total planned non-health foreign assistance was calculated by subtracting the total planned 
health aid from total planned foreign aid. Per-capita planned spending figures for US foreign aid recipient 
nations were calculated using population statistics as reported by the World Bank’s online database [17]. 
Summary statistics (median levels) on planned health spending are calculated and reported by WHO re-
gion (Africa, the Americas, Eastern Mediterranean, Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Western Pacific).
Metrics to assess the strength of governmental institutions (economic and health systems) for all nations 
analyzed in our study were established. These metrics were derived from descriptive data from online 
databases of Transparency International (TI), Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), and the 
World Bank (WB); they included metrics of corruption (from TI), [18] global burden of disease (GBD, 
from IHME) [19] life expectancy (as reported by the WB), and gross domestic product (GDP, from WB) 
[17]. Transparent governance was measured on a zero to ten scale (unitless), with higher values corre-
sponding to more transparency (less corruption); values were available for each year in the observation 
period. Global burden of disease was reported in thousands of disability adjusted life-years (DALYs) per 
100 000 persons due to all causes. Life expectancy was reported in years, and GDP was reported in US 
Dollars (US$).
To examine possible associations between planned health aid and geopolitics, we extracted data from the 
Council on Foreign Relations’ (CFR) annual Preventive Priorities Survey (PPS), which draws on numer-
ous quantitative and qualitative sources to categorize nations based on their ability to affect US national 
security interests [20]. The sources included sending a survey to over 7000 foreign policy experts, aca-
demics, and US government officials to identify and rank the most pressing national security concerns. 
Nations or regions in conflict are identified on an annual basis (Appendix S1 in Online Supplementary 
Document) as being the most geopolitically relevant to American foreign policy; these are then stratified 
into four groups based on their potential impact on US interests: critical, significant, limited, or none [20].
Study definitions
Among US planned aid recipient nations, four different threat levels were established for the purposes of 
statistical analysis. The study cohorts were derived from the CFR PPS. As defined by the CFR, “critical” 
threat nations are those that directly threaten the US homeland, trigger US military involvement because 
of treaty commitments, or threaten the supply of strategic US resources. “Significant” threats are those 
countries of strategic importance to the US but do not involve a mutual-defense treaty commitment. “Lim-
ited” threats are defined as those that could have severe humanitarian consequences in countries of lim-
ited strategic importance to the US.
If a nation was not identified as posing a threat of any kind during the 8-year observation period, it was 
categorized as a “no-threat” nation. Among the nations posing some degree of threat to US interests be-
tween 2009 and 2016, their categorization was determined by the most frequent threat level posed during 
the study period. For example, a nation categorized as a posing a limited threat to US interests posed that 
specific threat level at the highest frequency over the observation period.
Statistical analysis
We used 2-sided, paired t tests to compare mean statistics in 2009 and 2016 across various state econom-
ic, governance, and health financing metrics for nations earmarked to receive US health aid (n = 73 in 
2009, n = 56 in 2016).
Associations between threat levels and planned US foreign health per-capita spending were subsequent-
ly analyzed using STATA software (version 14.1 SE, StataCorp, College Station, TX, USA). We fitted mul-
tivariable regression models specifying planned health aid per capita as the dependent variable, using 
cluster-correlated robust standard errors to account for within-country correlation over time.[21,22] As 
a robustness check, in a secondary analysis we lagged by one year the time-varying explanatory variables 
(PPS-defined threat level, time, GDP per-capita and non-health planned foreign aid per capita) to ensure 
that for this subset of correlations, the exposure preceded the outcome. If a country received no aid in a 
given year, it was included in the regression analysis with an input of “0.” In order to avoid an assump-
tion of linear effects, GDP per capita figures were categorized into tertiles. Regression coefficients were 
reported in US$ per-capita with corresponding 95% confidence intervals and p-values connoting levels 
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of statistical significance (see Appendix S2 in Online Supplementary Document for further details on 
regression specifications).
RESULTS
Of the 194 nations recognized by the WHO, 80 (41.2%) were designated to receive federally directed US 
health aid at some point between 2009-2016. Thirty-Three African nations were a part of this cohort, 
representing the largest share (40.7%) of any WHO region. Thirteen (16.0%) nations from the Americas 
and 12 (14.8%) each from the Eastern Mediterranean and Europe were the next most represented regions, 
with six (7.4%) and five (6.2%) nations targeted for health aid in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, 
respectively. While 80 nations were identified for planned health spending at some point during the study 
period, there were fewer on an annual basis. For example, only 73 were targeted recipients in 2009, which 
was the highest among all years observed (Figure 1; panel A); this number declined to 56 by 2016 (Fig-
ure 1; panel B).
Median per-capita planned health spending across all countries remained the same in both 2009 and 
2016 at US$ 0.65. Fluctuations were observed within the observation period, as the highest median 
planned spending levels were observed in 2011 at US$ 0.88 per-capita and the lowest in 2014 at US$ 
Figure 1. A. Distribution of planned US per-capita health spending globally in 2009. Data on planned US health 
spending in 2009 was obtained from (http://beta.foreignassistance.gov). Per-capita figures were calculated using 
population statistics from the World Bank. B. Distribution of planned US per-capita health spending globally in 
2016. Data on planned US health spending in 2016 was obtained from (http://beta.foreignassistance.gov). 
Per-capita figures were calculated using population statistics from the World Bank.
A.
B.
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0.58. Across regions, median per-capita spending increased among nations in the Western Pacific (US$ 
0.32 in 2009, US$ 0.58 in 2016), Southeast Asia (US$ 0.13 in 2009, US$ 0.32 in 2016), and Africa (US$ 
3.39 in 2009, US$ 3.72 in 2016); spending decreased in the Eastern Mediterranean (US$ 0.58 in 2009, 
US$ 0.11 in 2016), Europe (US$ 0.33 in 2009, US$ 0.00 in 2016), and the Americas (US$ 0.13 in 2009, 
US$ 0.00 in 2016). On a national level, 49 nations experienced an overall decline in planned per-capita 
spending levels (median decline: - US$ 0.30) between 2009 and 2016 (Figure 2). The largest such de-
clines were observed in Namibia (-US$ 31.96), Ghana (-US$ 20.45), Jordan (-US$ 12.81), Rwanda (-US$ 
6.50), and Georgia (-US$ 4.53). Twenty-seven nations saw an increase in planned spending (median in-
crease: US$ 1.07) during the same period. The largest such increases were observed in Swaziland (+US$ 
10.97), Lesotho (+US$ 9.38), Barbados (+US$ 7.84), Côte d’Ivoire (+US$ 6.10), and South Sudan (+US$ 
4.42). All nations that exhibited an increase in per-capita spending also experienced concomitant increas-
es in population.
Thirty-nine nations posed some degree of threat to US national security interests between 2009-2016 ac-
cording to the PPS. The majority posed a limited threat (n = 22), while 11 nations posed significant and 
6 posed critical threats (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Nations posing limited, significant, or critical threats to US national security interests between 2009 – 
2016. Data on nations posing some degree of threat to US national security interest (between 2009-2016) was 
obtained from the Council on Foreign Relations’ annual Preventive Priorities Survey. Larger circles correspond to 
higher threat level (smallest circle = limited threat, largest circle = critical threat).
Figure 2. Change in per-capita planned US health spending between 2009 and 2016. Source: 
Foreignassistance.gov and the World Bank.
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Mean GDP (3117 vs 2561, P < 0.001), population (64.96 million vs 59.9 million, P < 0.001), life expec-
tancy (65.5 years vs 63.5, P < 0.001)), and governmental transparency (3.11 vs 2.72, P < 0.001) were all 
higher among planned recipients of health aid in 2016 (n = 56) relative to 2009 (n = 73), and these find-
ings were statistically significant (Table 1). Planned health (4.07 vs 3.56, P = 0.38) and non-health (9.70 
vs 5.19, P = 0.02) aid per-capita and GBD (2763.5 vs 2588.1, P = 0.01) were both higher in 2009 vs 2016.
The magnitude of planned US health aid varied across the four study cohorts over the study period. 
Among no-threat nations, median per-capita planned spending increased from US$ 0.84 in 2009 to an 
eight-year high of US$ 1.59 in 2016. Across limited-threat nations, median spending varied year-to-year 
though there was an overall upward trend (US$ 0.31 in 2009, US$ 0.47 in 2016, eight-year high in 2015 
at US$ 0.59). Progressive declines were observed across both significant- (US$ 0.65 in 2009, US$ 0.51 
in 2016) and critical-threat (US$ 0.26 in 2009, US$ 0.10 in 2016) cohorts. Over the duration of the pe-
riod studied, median spending within each cohort was highest among no-threat nations (US$ 1.16 
per-capita) and subsequently demonstrated a negative correlation with rising threat level (US$ 0.45 among 
limited-threat nations, US$ 0.42 within the significant cohort, and US$ 0.20 within the critical cohort).
In the univariate regression analysis examining the relationship between aid and geopolitics, there was a 
strong negative association between planned per-capita health spending and threat level across all strata: 
limited-threat cohort (b = -2.27; 95% CI, -4.27 to -0.26, P = 0.03); significant-threat cohort (b = -3.04; 95% 
CI -5.06 to -1.02, P = 0.004); and critical threat cohort (b = -2.67; 95% CI, -5.15 to -0.19, P = 0.04). In 
the one-year lagged covariate specification, similar effect sizes were observed: limited-threat cohort 
(b = -2.22; 95% CI, -4.24 to -0.20, P = 0.03); significant-threat cohort (b = -2.93; 95% CI, -5.02 to -0.84, 
P = 0.01); and critical-threat cohort (b = -2.84; 95% CI, -5.22 to -0.46, P = 0.02).
The multivariable regression model was adjusted for time (in years), levels of GDP per-capita, and planned 
US non-health per-capita spending (Table 2). Critical-threat countries had the largest decline in health 
aid spending (b = -3.81; 95% CI, -5.84 - -1.78, P = <0.001) over the duration of the study period, and this 
finding was statistically significant. The effect size increased with higher threat level, and all associations 
were statistically significant. In the one-year lagged analysis, similar effect sizes and trends were again ob-
served (Table 2), with the largest decline in planned health spending occurring among critical-threat na-
tions (b = -3.91; 95% CI, -5.94 - -1.88, P = <0.001). Non-health aid demonstrated a positive association 
with per-capita health spending in the primary analyses (b = 0.02; 95% CI, 0.00 to 0.05), P = 0.04) while 
escalating tertiles of GDP per-capita were associated with decreased planned health aid.
Table 1. Baseline mean characteristics (STD) of all nations targeted as recipients of US health foreign assistance in 
2009 and 2016*
Variable 2009 leVels 2016 leVels P-Value
Number of planned health aid country recipients 73 56 –
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per-capita† 2561.13 (338.74) 3117.48 (376.92) <0.001
Global Burden of Disease‡ 2763.5 2588.1 0.010
Population§ 59.90 (199.10) 64.96 (209.72) <0.001
Life expectancy‖ 63.5 (0.92) 65.5 (0.84) <0.001
Transparency Index¶ 2.72 (0.11) 3.11 (0.12) <0.001
Per-capita planned health aid** 4.07 (0.88) 3.56 (0.70) 0.380
Per-capita planned non-health aid** 9.70 (3.16) 5.19 (1.70) 0.020
STD – standard deviation
*Data on gross domestic product, life expectancy, and population figures obtained from the World Bank; Global Burden of Disease 
figures obtained from Institute for Health Metrics; information on Transparency obtained from Transparency International; and 
health aid financing data was obtained from foreignassistnace.gov.
†US$.
‡Reported in thousands of disability adjusted life-years per 100 000 persons. Last data available from 2015.
§Millions of persons.
‖Reported in years. Last data available from 2014.
¶Published by Transparency International annually. Index is on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 connoting no transparency (high corrup-
tion) and 10 connoting perfect transparency (zero corruption).
**Data on planned health spending obtained from foreignassistance.gov.
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Table 2. Correlates of US foreign health per-capita spending
Variable Primary analysis secondary analysis (lagged coVariates)
Coefficient (95% CI)* P-value Coefficient (95% CI)* P-value
Year 0.00 (-0.21 to 0.21) 0.99 0.02 (-0.14 to 0.21) 0.68
Threat level:†
None – – – –
Limited -2.26 (-4.27 to -0.26) 0.03 -2.21 (-4.21 to -0.22) 0.03
Significant -3.33 (-5.73 to -0.93) 0.01 -3.08 (-5.46 to -0.69) 0.01
Critical -3.81 (-5.84 to -1.78) <0.001 -3.91 (-5.94 to -1.88) <0.001
Non-health per-capita spending:‡
0.02 (0.00 to 0.05) 0.04 0.02 (0.00 to 0.04) 0.02
GDP per-capita spending:
Lowest tertile – – – –
Middle tertile -0.84 (-3.46 to 1.79) 0.53 -0.71 (-3.45 to 2.02) 0.61
Highest tertile 0.01 (-3.78 to 3.81) 0.99 -0.32 (-3.85 to 3.20) 0.86
CI – confidence interval
1*Regression coefficient is reported in United States Dollars (US$) per-capita.
†Threat level as determined by the Council on Foreign Relations annual Preventive Priorities Survey.
‡Reported in US$ in per-capita.
DISCUSSION
In this longitudinal, cross-country analysis, we observed a strong negative association between threat lev-
el and magnitude of per-capita health aid. Furthermore, a dose-response relationship was observed in the 
multivariable model, whereby increasing levels of threat were associated with larger effects on magnitude 
of planned annual health spending; these findings were statistically significant across both the primary 
and one-year lagged analyses.
In ancillary findings, we also demonstrate that there has been a general stability in median levels of fed-
erally-directed, planned per-capita health aid between 2009 and 2016 globally. When examining region-
al trends over this time period, decreased allocations to the Americas, Eastern Mediterranean, and Europe 
were observed while increased planned expenditures to Africa, the Western Pacific, and Southeast Asia 
occurred simultaneously. In total, however, the number of nations earmarked for US health foreign assis-
tance declined by nearly 25% (n = 18) over the study period; further, a majority of nations (n = 49) saw a 
decline in planned per-capita health spending while 27 nations observed a corresponding increase. The 
median increase in per-capita spending (US$ 1.07) was nearly triple the median decline (-US$ 0.30) over 
the study period.
The finding that countries posing threats to American security interests (domestically or abroad) receive 
less in earmarked health aid annually contradicted our study hypothesis which premised no link between 
geopolitics and decisions on health aid allocation. The possible consequences of these trends in aid spend-
ing are likely to be observed in regions such as the Eastern Mediterranean, where the nexus of poor pre-ex-
isting health outcomes collide with strong geopolitical concerns. The retrenchment of health aid from the 
Eastern Mediterranean may reflect an acknowledgement on the part of US policymakers that despite high 
disease burden, these nations bear too much internal instability to effectively utilize health foreign assis-
tance [23,24]. The region is home to half of the nations that pose critical threats to American national se-
curity interests (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan) and five of the eleven countries that pose significant 
threats (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, and Yemen) according to the PPS. Yet, these high-threat countries 
boast higher median burdens of disease and larger population sizes relative to non-threat nations. Trends 
in US planned aid have, however, declined over time, not increased.
Our second primary finding was that the scope of US planned health aid consolidated over the duration 
of the Obama administration, as a similar amount of resources were allocated to a progressively smaller 
group of target nations by 2016. Regions such as Europe and the Americas now have planned per-capita 
health spending values of zero, while the Eastern Mediterranean has seen a nearly 80% decline in medi-
an planned health aid since 2009. From a global security standpoint, the reallocation of health resources 
away from the aforementioned regions may in fact be destabilizing. Many nations throughout Latin Amer-
ica, for instance, have been most affected by Zika virus, which spread across nations with fledgling health 
systems and weak infrastructure for disease surveillance and associated early-warning systems [25]. The 
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estimated global cost impact of the virus, however, was estimated at US$ 3.5 billion in 2016 [26], threat-
ening the US directly and serving as a reminder that disregard of certain diseases may have important 
implications for national borders.
It is likely that poor health outcomes may precede or follow political instability within nations [27]; the 
argument of whether health aid can effectively address crisis and corruption indiscriminately is still being 
shaped. On the one hand, supporters of SHD argue that regions like the Americas or the Eastern Medi-
terranean benefit from increased health aid, citing the increasing evidence which correlates PEPFAR fund-
ing with the rise of more peaceful societies [5]. On the contrary, a primary obstacle to scaling up health 
aid is that it requires the presence of at least rudimentary systems of governance to be effective. Many of 
the countries that pose critical threats (Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq) lack the essential architecture of a func-
tioning civil society making them difficult targets for planned health aid. Additionally, there are a number 
of factors that may influence a country’s stability including external threats (state and non-state), migrant 
flows, climate change, and socioeconomic instability.
Despite the aforementioned tension, data do suggest that good health can precede robust development; 
the rise of several East Asian nations over the past twenty years proves illustrative where health invest-
ments preceded development.[28] Improving public health systems through investments in horizontal-
ly-directed aid programs is viewed as an effective approach among developing nations [29]. Proponents 
of SHD argue that state stability may follow. Yet, the results of our study suggest that geopolitical consid-
erations have not always driven decisions on health aid, representing a possible opportunity lost.
Our analysis has several strengths. In addition to filling a critical void in the literature on the landscape 
and possible determinants of American health aid spending, our results are based on the latest available 
data from the US federal government, capturing all flows of federally planned foreign aid globally. We 
capture trends in planned health aid across the full duration of the Obama presidency and explore novel 
linkages between such aid and geopolitical considerations using time-lagged, multivariable regression 
analyses. To our knowledge, this is the first such longitudinal and global analysis of American foreign 
health aid that has been conducted.
The primary limitation of this study is our inability to verify the magnitude of underreporting in planned 
health aid during the observation period. There are known limitations in the completeness and quality 
of global health financing data which have been previously described [30]. While our analysis focuses 
specifically on US health aid, we recognize that there are a number of data sources that can be used to 
track development assistance for health from non-US state actors [31]. Given the magnitude of non-state 
health aid, potential complementarities and/or substitution effects (whether coordinated or not) could 
have affected our estimates [32]. Furthermore, our analysis does not distinguish between the provision 
of health aid vs the management of health aid [32-34]. For example, health aid provided by the US Gov-
ernment but managed through global health partnerships may have a more muted or powerful effect on 
health diplomacy than if the aid were managed directly by the US Government.
A second potential limitation is that our analysis relies on planned health aid. There is a general consen-
sus about the unpredictability of actual aid flows.[35-37] The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
and the subsequent Accra Agenda for Action adopted at the 2008 Accra High Level Forum attempted to 
address this problem in part by committing donor countries to providing forward expenditure and im-
plementation plans so that recipient countries could better incorporate aid into their medium-term plans. 
In this specific analysis, we focused on planned aid, which was more consistent with our conceptual goal 
to better understand how year-to-year strategic thinking may have influenced the obligation of health aid. 
However, actual aid disbursements (eg, spent aid) may be quite different and are associated with their 
own limitations. For example, spent aid can often reflect the implementation of projects that were actu-
ally conceived in years prior, thus introducing unpredictable lags in any assessment of how aid is deployed 
for strategic goals [38].
A final primary limitation is regarding the methodology that is utilized in conducting the Preventive Pri-
orities Survey. The focus of the survey is on ranking traditional nation-state vs nation state conflicts, not 
potential trans-border threats such as disease outbreaks, famines, and/or economic crises. Only once in 
the last twenty years has a pandemic been listed as a threat (West Africa due to Ebola in 2014). This as-
pect of the PPS has likely resulted in an unclear amount of threat-level underestimation, reducing our 
statistical power to detect differences between the 4 categories of threat (eg, since the majority of nations 
were listed as no-threat).
V
IE
W
PO
IN
TS
Have geopolitics influenced decisions on American health foreign assistance efforts during the Obama presidency?
RE
SE
A
RC
H
 A
RT
IC
LE
S
www.jogh.org •  doi: 10.7189/jogh.08.010417 9 June 2018  •  Vol. 8 No. 1 •  010417
In conclusion, the obligation of American health aid has remained stable in per-capita terms since 2009 
though its geographic scope has narrowed over this time period. Health foreign assistance efforts have 
largely been consolidated within Africa while other regions that boast similarly high burdens of disease 
have seen their levels of earmarked health aid decline, and in some cases, approach zero. Given the em-
phasis of President Donald Trump to use taxpayer funds towards national and economic security goals, 
global health and foreign aid is less prioritized, facing severe cuts with a nearly 30% decline in recently 
proposed budgetary earmarks [39]. Yet, sustaining and perhaps even expanding investments in strategic 
health diplomacy may not only continue to save lives and burnish American soft power abroad but, in 
this age of rising pandemics and climate change, represent a necessary pillar of a multimodal approach 
to strengthening homeland security.
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